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Immigration and Crime in Catalonia, Spain: 
What’s the Connection? 
Towards a Theory on Immigrant Crime
Rebecca Westbrook
Introduction
The crime rate in Spain has increased substantially in the last 20 years. In 2008, accord-
ing to the National Institute of Statistics, the crime rate increased by 17.1% from the previ-
ous year (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica [INE], 2008). Simultaneously Spain has changed 
from a country of heavy emigration to an attractive country for economic migrants. Since 
2000, there has been a 24% increase in the number of legally registered immigrants residing 
in Spain (Cornelius, 2004). Spaniards have made a connection between these parallel phe-
nomena, believing that one variable has caused the other. In a recent opinion poll conduct-
ed in 2007 by a non-profit organization, SOS Racismo, 60% of Spaniards reported that they 
believed immigrants to be the cause in the recent increase in crime (SOS Racismo, 2007). 
While it is easy to simply regard these fears as xenophobia creeping into a society afraid 
of change, according to Calavita (2005), a pro-immigrant researcher, they are in fact valid 
fears. Calavita found that in 2001 the proportion of the prison population born abroad in 
Spain was twenty five times higher than the proportion of immigrants in the population and 
she says their numbers continue to grow each year (2005). While she says that discrimina-
tion could play a role, Spanish citizens have not. The negative perception of immigrants as 
criminals predominates in their minds and it appears to be here to stay.  
In the study to follow, using the case of Catalonia, I will examine the level of immigra-
tion and crime rates between 2003 and 2007 to see if in fact there is a relationship between 
crime and immigration, and if so why? And if my hypothesis is incorrect, then what is it that 
causes immigrants to commit crime and at a rate higher than native Spaniards? Using both 
a criminological and sociological based framework to analyze this situation, I hypothesize 
that when demographic variables are controlled for there is only a weak correlation between 
immigration and crime. The majority of individuals who choose to immigrate to Spain and 
Catalonia specifically are single men between the ages of 18 and 35 and it is precisely this 
population that criminologists such as Wilson and Sampson (2005) claim have the highest 
incidence of criminal delinquency. Therefore I hypothesize that it is these demographic 
characteristics of immigrant populations and not specifically the status of being an immigrant 
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that is the causal variable for this correlation.
Understanding the Immigrant-Crime Linkage
Immigration to Spain
Scholars agree that before the fall of Franco in 1975, Spain was a country of emi-
gration, with Spaniards immigrating mainly to Northern European countries in search of 
employment. Spain also had a high level of internal migration from the rural regions in 
the south to the industrial cities of the north (Calavita, 2005; Cornelius, 2004; Rovolis 
& Tragaki, 2006). At the same time, Spaniards began to attain higher levels of education, 
spending more years in school, which led to a substantial reduction in the availability of 
workers in the labor intensive agricultural sector (Potot, 2009). When Spain joined the Eu-
ropean Community in 1986 its economy experienced a substantial growth and expansion. 
This situation, Cornelius (2004) argues created the pull factors that drew willing economic 
immigrants to Spain for the first time.
In this initial phase of immigration during the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of immi-
grants came from within Europe but progressively this changed, with new migratory flows 
originating from Latin America and Northern Africa. Immigrants from these regions of the 
world predominantly came from the Dominican Republic, the Andean region countries 
and Morocco (Cornelius, 2004). Continuing from that first wave, the level of immigra-
tion continued to grow each year with an increasing number of immigrants originating 
from third world nations. In 2000, 60% of foreigners to Spain originated from outside the 
European Union with 29.3% coming from Africa and another 22% from Latin America 
(Ministerio del Interior [MIR], 2002). Beginning around the year 2000, immigrants began 
to arrive in Spain from Asia, with the majority coming from Pakistan and Bangladesh and to 
a lesser extent from China and the Philippines (Aubia & Josep, 2004). 
Like other European countries, Cornelius (2004) claims that among Spain’s immigrant 
population there is a high incidence of illegality, with its proportion being only second 
to that of France. Using government data on the number of rejections issued in the most 
recent regularization campaign in 2001, Calavita (2005) speculates that as little as 300,000 
to as many as 700,000 illegal immigrants reside in Spain. Illegal immigrants tend to work 
in the informal sector, and are predominant in the service and agricultural sector (Calavita, 
2005). She argues that illegal immigrants would not be represented in the government’s 
regularization campaign statistics. Therefore when examining the statistical data for immi-
grants, it is important to note that the data could be skewed in favor of EU immigrants who 
are more likely to have legal status (Calavita, 2005). Although these statistics might show an 
incomplete picture, they nonetheless provide a breadth of knowledge that is invaluable for 
examining the immigrant situation in Spain. 
According to census data, the majority of immigrants are male with the exception of 
Latin American immigrants who tend to be women immigrating specifically to work in 
the domestic service sector. They also tend to be between the ages of 18 to 35 years old 
(INE, 2007). Both Calavita (2005) and myself have hypothesized that it is these typical 
demographic characteristics of immigrants that could possibly explain their overrepresenta-
tion in crime statistics because it is typically young single males that criminologists argue are 
responsible for the majority of criminal acts. 
Another plausible explanation as to why there might be a correlation between immi-
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gration and crime lies in the economic situation that immigrants typically find themselves 
in. Immigrants in Spain typically have higher unemployment rates than that of their native 
Spaniard peers but a substantial difference exists between different immigrant groups. For 
example, Moroccans tend to have the highest rate at 32% in 2006, with Rumanians at 20% 
and native Spaniards at 7.6% (INE, 2007). When immigrants are employed in the formal 
labor market they typically tend to work in the service sector such as in the tourism industry, 
in construction or agriculture (Huntoon, 1998). These sectors are highly volatile and vul-
nerable to global economic fluctuations thus exposing those individuals dependent on them 
to varying degrees of economic stress (Aparicio, 2007). That could possibly be a motivating 
factor to engage in criminal behavior in order to survive. 
Other case studies have made the connection between economic stressors and its rela-
tionship to crime. For example, in Glaser and Rice’s 1959 study on crime and unemploy-
ment in the United States, they found that adult crime increased in times of high unem-
ployment (as cited by Jones, 2006). Hansen and Machin also found in their 2002 study in 
England and Wales that an increase in the minimum wage was correlated with a decrease 
in crime in areas most affected by the wage increase (as cited by Jones, 2006). Box found 
a correlation between crime and economically disadvantaged communities in 11 of the 16 
cases that he examined in England between 1974 and 1985 (as cited by Jones, 2006).
 Structural inequality explanations of criminal behavior have been the focus of the 
majority of modern research on the causes of crime. According to Merton’s Strain Theory, 
when individuals lack the legitimate means to realistically achieve the middle class goal of 
material wealth, they seek alternative and sometimes illegal means to achieve the same ends. 
That is how he explained social class differences in the incidence of criminal behavior (as 
cited by Jones, 2006). Both Merton and Durkheim emphasized that it was not necessarily 
the circumstance of poverty that led to crime but rather the feeling of relative deprivation 
by disadvantaged groups in comparison to the middle class (as cited by Jones, 2006). Being 
that many immigrants are denied the legal right to work and thus are forced into the lowest 
paid positions in the margins of society, Strain Theory would lead one to expect to find a 
relationship between immigration and crime. 
 One reason that immigrants to Spain typically occupy marginalized positions in Span-
ish society lies in the recent policy shifts implemented by the government under pressure 
from the European Union. Before Spain joined the European Community [EC] in 1986, 
it did not have a formal immigration policy. Therefore there were essentially no illegal 
immigrants (Calavita, 2003). However with the implementation of the European Union’s 
Schengen agreement in 1992, all internal borders between EC members were removed. As 
a result Spain was pressured to tighten up its external borders and increase internal regula-
tions so as not to be the weakest link in immigration (Agrela, 2002). Wanting to impress 
its new economic partners, Spain adopted a number of policies that ignored its structural 
internal demand for cheap and flexible immigrant labor. This forced many employers to hire 
illegally and switch to the informal, unregulated sector which has had lasting effects on the 
economic and social positions of immigrants (Moreno, 2004). 
While Moreno explains this policy shift by portraying Spain sympathetically as a coun-
try caught between its own internal needs and those of the EU, Calavita (2005) portrays 
this same shift as a strategic economic decision. She argues that immigrants provide a crucial 
form of cheap and flexible labor for Spain’s developing economy and in order to keep them 
profitable they need to be exploitable (Calavita, 2005). In order to achieve this, the Spanish 
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government has implemented immigration policies that have institutionalized the illegality 
of immigrants. 
Although Calavita (2005) portrays the Spanish government as rather cynical, since its 
ingression in the EU, Spain has had five regularization campaigns (1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 
and 2001). Undocumented immigrants already residing in Spain for the first time could ap-
ply for legal residence permits lasting typically for one year (Migration Information Source 
[MIS], 2005). Each of these campaigns has received more applications than the previous 
one. However, according to the MIS (2005), each has had a steadily decreasing rate of ap-
proval. Nonetheless, Huntoon, (1998) gives the Spanish government some credit in trying 
to address some of the problems through these regularization campaigns. He argues that 
while these were valid attempts by the Spanish government to address the pseudo illegal 
status of many immigrants, because of their rigid application requirements the effect was 
minimal. The majority of immigrants that it was intended to reach were ineligible and thus 
forced to maintain their undocumented status (Huntoon, 1998).
Calavita (2005) argues there are long lasting negative implications for immigrants who 
are undocumented. She claims that by being forced to maintain their illegal status, im-
migrants cannot ask for redress (Calavita, 2005). Thus they are an easy population to ma-
nipulate and will work in conditions that are economically profitable for employers. This 
implies that immigrants are not allowed to integrate into society and are increasingly forced 
to the margins of society (Moreno, 2005). They are not only considered to be an outsider 
in Spanish society, but worse, they have been construed as threats, dangerous and essentially 
outlaws because of their pseudo illegal status. 
According to Symbolic Interactionist theorists, such as Lemert, the effect of such a la-
bel can be self perpetuating in that by being labeled a criminal, individuals sometimes live up 
to that expectation and actively seek out criminal acts to engage in (as cited by Jones, 2006). 
Therefore the argument offered by the literature that emphasizes the failure of immigrants 
to integrate into Spanish society and the label placed upon them would lead one to expect 
to find that being an immigrant is linked to increased rates of criminal behavior.
While the majority of researchers discuss the economic and social effects of Spain’s 
harsh immigration policies, Tello (2008) and Simmel (1971), take a psychological approach. 
Tello (2008) argues that immigrants internalize the illegal identity that society has placed 
on them and they begin to feel that they are in fact an “outsider.” Simmel (1971) identifies 
a form of interaction he calls, “the stranger,” which he defines to be someone that is not 
attached to society through relatives, locality, occupation or really with anyone (as cited 
by Jones, 2006). The function of such an identity according to Simmel (1971) is to be ex-
cluded from society, thereby solidifying the social cohesion of the rest of the group at “the 
stranger’s” expense (as cited by Jones, 2006). While he does not specifically attach this type 
of interaction to immigrant populations or to criminal behavior one could expect to find 
this type of relationship among young single male immigrant populations who individually 
immigrate to Spain. Also, the lack of attachment typified by this type of interaction pattern 
could be related to criminal behavior. 
Tello (2008) argues that the creation of the immigrant identity as an outsider explains 
the tendency of immigrants to live where they feel most comfortable, with other immigrants 
of the same background. This has led to the formation of many ethnic enclaves in Barce-
lona. However, by creating their own neighborhoods, separate from the rest of Spanish 
society, Tello (2008) claims that they are only reinforcing their own separation. Besides pre-
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venting integration, social disorganization theorists such as Ernest Burgess and Robert Park 
argue that ethnic enclaves are characterized by high rates of resident mobility and low levels 
of integration (as cited by Jones, 2006). The effect being that residents see little incentive 
to invest what little resources they have in the community or to donate the time needed to 
foster a sense of community so social problems tend to go unaddressed. It is these conditions 
Burgess and Park argue, that have the highest potential for producing criminal delinquency 
(as cited by Jones, 2006). 
Shaw and McKay, in looking at the environmental causes of immigrant crime found 
in the case of inner-city Chicago found that the heterogeneity of cultures and languages 
among residents in the neighborhoods seemed to prevent the community from exerting 
social control over its delinquent residents (as cited by Jones, 2006). This they argued was 
because the difference in cultural norms between the different immigrant groups meant 
that they could not reach a consensus of common values to defend. So delinquent residents 
increasingly engaged in more criminal behavior with no social repercussions from the com-
munity in which they lived. This they argued explains why deviance had persisted from one 
generation to the next despite the fact that there was little consistency in residents as groups 
moved in and out frequently (as cited by Jones, 2006). 
While Shaw and McKay argue that high crime rates in immigrant neighborhoods will 
persist across generations, Tello (2008) disagrees. She instead believes that as immigrants 
slowly begin to integrate into society and slowly move up the economic ladder they will 
be able to demand more rights and make sure that their presence is known (Tello, 2008). 
Moren-Alegret (2002) also takes an optimistic point of view for the future of immi-
grant integration in Spain. She argues that immigrants are increasingly pooling their social 
capital to create social organizations which are in turn used to demand changes in anti-im-
migrant legislation to favor their needs (Moren-Alegret, 2002). While her argument holds 
true for certain immigrant populations that she examines, such as the Swedish and Japanese, 
these groups tend to belong to higher social classes than other immigrant groups such as the 
Moroccan population. Because of these class distinctions, ethnic groups of lower social class 
might not have the same social capital skills or the resources to pool collectively in the same 
way as higher socioeconomic groups. These factors could account for the different success 
rates among immigrant populations at integrating into Spanish society. 
While Moren-Alegret (2002) looks at the level of social capital immigrant popula-
tions have and its implication for integration, Aparicio (2007) uses immigrants’ educational 
achievements to measure their relative success at integrating into Spanish society. She exam-
ines 1.5 and 2nd generation Peruvian, Dominican and Moroccan immigrants. She defines 
a 1.5 generation immigrant to be someone who was born abroad but moved to Spain at a 
relatively young age and therefore was predominantly socialized through the host countries 
institutions. Aparicio (2007) found that all three immigrant groups achieved less than their 
Spanish peers but more than their first generation parents. Moroccans were typically the 
first to leave school, followed by the Dominicans and lastly the Peruvians who generally 
achieved levels of education that were most comparable to that of their native Spaniards 
peers. She speculates the cause of such a discrepancy to be that Peruvians have weaker social 
ties to their ethnic community and thus tend to foster more relationships with Spaniards. 
Aparicio (2007) says this in turn means they are typically better received by native Spaniards 
and are as a consequence less likely to be discriminated against than their Moroccan and 
Dominican peers who are more strongly connected to their ethnic community.
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In Spain, citizenship is obtained by Juis Sanguis or by common blood and thus sec-
ond generation immigrants with illegal parents become illegal themselves. Aparicio (2007) 
addresses the cyclical implications of this policy. She claims that while second generation 
undocumented immigrants generally have higher levels of education than their parents; they 
lack the opportunities to use it (Aparicio, 2007). Like their parents, they have no choice but 
to work in the illegal informal sector, which is generally comprised of lower level jobs. This 
she argues only reinforces their exclusion and distinguishes them as different and inferior and 
fails to provide incentives for further education on their part, or the opportunity to integrate 
(Aparicio, 2007). 
 Calavita (1998) is also pessimistic about the long term prospects for the integration of 
third world immigrant groups in Spain. She argues a distinction has been drawn between 
the connotation of the word “immigrant,” which is used to differentiate between third 
world immigrants, and the term “foreigner,” which is reserved just for first world immi-
grants (Calavita, 1998). This distinction has created a hierarchy among immigrants and dis-
tinguishes between desirable groups - those who have generally been integrated successfully 
in Spain and those of the third world who are rejected and excluded from Spanish society 
(Calavita, 1998). 
It is important to note here that the examined literature has not explicitly mentioned 
that third world immigrants typically tend to differ from Europeans in racial terms and this 
undoubtedly plays a significant role in the different outcomes for immigrant groups. I will 
address the possible role of race later in the literature review. 
In contrast to Calavita’s (1998) between-class analysis, Potot (2008) uses within-class 
reasons to explain why some immigrant groups have failed to integrate. Using the case study 
of the small rural town of El Ejido, located in Andalusia, Potot (2008) argues that economic 
competition between immigrant groups of the same class has prevented them from pooling 
their social leverage against employers. She argues that the North African immigrants who 
have been fighting for social, economic and political rights from employers have also come 
into conflict with the Rumanian immigrant population. This, Potet (2009) argues, occurs 
when North-African immigrants, who typically intend to settle long term in Spain, decide 
to strike, and the Rumanians, who generally immigrate for short periods of time, continue 
to work. This conflict of interest has prevented the two immigrants groups from aligning 
and petitioning collectively for higher wages, legal work contracts and overall better work-
ing conditions thus allowing employers to continue to exploit them (Potet, 2009). 
Potot (2009) goes further when examining the conflict and tensions among locals and 
immigrant populations. She argues that the higher discrimination experienced by North Af-
rican immigrants in comparison to Rumanians is due to a long history of animosity towards 
“Los moros,” or North African Muslim populations and their tendency for long-term settle-
ment (Potet, 2009). Permanent immigration of foreign groups can lead to drastic changes 
to the ethnic, social and cultural dynamics of the community, which is perceived as a threat 
by locals (Potet, 2009). Agrela (2002) also addresses this subject. She claims that immigrants 
are perceived to threaten the cultural hegemony of Spain and are viewed as the cause of the 
country’s high unemployment rate despite the fact that they generally fill a different niche 
in the labor market than most native Spaniards (Agrela, 2002). 
Calavita (1998, 2003, and 2005) argues that the immigrant threat has been amplified 
and generalized to a perception that immigrants actually represent a danger to the safety of 
Spaniards. They have been portrayed as criminals and blamed for the increase in crime rates 
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(Calavita 1998, 2003, 2005; Agrela, 2002). This perception has been captured by nation-
wide opinion polls of immigrants by Spaniards. According to SOS Racisimo in their 2002 
opinion poll, 60% of Spaniards believed that immigration had caused an increase in the 
crime rate in (S0S Racisimo, 2002). Since 2002, these xenophobic beliefs have not dimin-
ished but have continued to reflect the majority of Spanish citizens. In another poll docu-
mented by Calavita (2005), it was found that one-third of Spaniards believe that immigrants 
are dangerous and pose a substantial threat to their safety. 
While it is easy to simply devalue these beliefs as xenophobic and overt examples of 
racism, Calavita, (2005) examined prison populations in Spain and found that in fact the 
foreign born prison population was twenty-five times higher than the proportion of im-
migrants in the population in 2001 and she says the number of foreign interned continues 
to grow each year. While this does support a correlation between immigration and crime, 
it could also simply reflect the idea that being undocumented is a crime or reflect the dis-
crimination that immigrants face in the criminal justice system. 
Increasingly, these perceptions have been used by conservative politicians to instill a 
climate of fear in the minds of Spaniards. Spanish Prime Minister Aznar when talking to the 
Italian press on a recent trip to Rome said, “…illegal immigration must be combated deci-
sively because illegal immigration generates criminal networks, and mafia rings that traffic 
in human beings” (Calavita, 2005, p. 137). This kind of political rhetoric has pressured the 
current liberal parliament to respond with increasingly restrictionist policies that marginalize 
immigrants more and push them further into the underground economy (Calavita, 1998). 
According to the theoretical literature thus presented, sociologists and criminologists 
argue that there are a number of internal and external circumstances that motivate individu-
als to commit crimes. The economic, environmental and social situations that they argue to 
be associated with higher levels of criminality have been documented by Spanish scholars 
to be present in the case of immigrant populations in Spain. The economic strain, lack of 
integration opportunities, formation of ethnic enclaves and immigrant’s internationalization 
of host-countries negative perceptions that scholars argue immigrant populations in Spain 
endure, would lead one to believe that a relationship exists between immigration and crime 
in the case of Catalonia. 
The Social Bases of Criminal Behavior
Race has been found to be related to criminal behavior. Flowers (1989) found that 
while whites are more likely to be both offenders and victims, minority groups specifically 
blacks and Hispanics have the highest crime rate in the United States. Another variable 
found to influence criminal behavior is an individuals’ social class. Using data provided by 
the Uniform Crime Report [UCR], Flowers (1989) found that adults from the lower-class 
overwhelming had higher rates of criminal behavior than middle and upper class adults. 
What the data shows is that there is an inverse relationship between social class and crime 
(Flowers, 1989). 
Criminologists such as, James Messerschimidt (2000), argue that gender is still the 
strongest predictor of criminal involvement. Gottfredson & Hirschi (1990) argue that men 
are more involved than women in criminal activity “always and everywhere” (as cited by 
Jones, 2006). Examining official statistics, Ronald Flowers (1989) found that 8 out of every 
10 persons arrested in the United States is male. Flowers (1989) argues that men desire to 
be physically dominant and powerful, which is most easily demonstrated through acts of ag-
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gression (Flowers, 1989). Age has increasingly been implicated in causing criminal behavior. 
Sampson & Wilson (2005) argue that nothing affects crime more than the number of young 
males present in a population. Flowers (1989) argues that almost all types of crime have an 
inverse relationship with age with the bulk of criminal involvement concentrated between 
the ages of 15 and 29 years old. 
Based upon the previous research examined, I would expect to find a relationship 
between immigration and crime in Catalonia. I would expect the strongest relationship to 
be found among those populations that differ significantly when comparing race, socioeco-
nomic status, age and gender demographics to native Spaniards. 
Methodology
To evaluate the relationship between immigration and crime I used two different data 
sets, the Statistical Institute of Catalonia (Idescat) and the Mosso d’ Esquadra (local police 
annual reports). I conducted a longitudinal study across a period of 5 years, beginning in 
2003 through 2007 and the unit of analysis was the autonomous community of Catalonia. 
To evaluate crime rates I used data provided by the annual crime reports of the Police 
of the Generalitat called the Mosso d’ Esquadra. While it does include data on the age, gen-
der and the country of origin of arrested individuals, it does not cross-tabulate between these 
three variables and therefore I was unable to analyze the possible influence of these variables.
The strengths in using the Idescat dataset are that it conducts population censuses on 
a yearly basis as compared to the census collected decennially by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica (National Institute of Statistics, [INE]). It also records country-specific age and 
gender demographics for each foreign population in Catalonia for the 5 year period that I 
examine. By distinguishing the demographics for each population then, I am not only able 
to look at the relationship between age and gender in the immigrant population as a whole 
compared to Spaniards but I can examine differences in crime rates between immigrant 
populations 
One important limitation to using the Idescat is its use of foreigner to be indicative 
of immigrant. Idescat defines foreigner to be to be anyone who is not a Spanish national 
and whose nationality follows that of their parents. Nationality in Spain is determined by 
blood right or Jus Sanguinis, and not by birthright or Jus Solis, like in many other countries 
(Idescat, 2009). Therefore, for statistical purposes this definition means not every foreign 
person is an immigrant in the traditional sense of the word or meaning born abroad. The 
effect of this is that it combines both the second generation immigrants who still maintain 
their foreign nationality and the first generation immigrants who were born abroad. Because 
Spanish law does not distinguish between these two groups and labels them both as foreign 
it demonstrates the lack of social, economic and political differences among them that in 
other countries might be statistically significant. 
Another important limitation of this study is that because individual level data is un-
available, I will be using aggregate level data to draw conclusions about individuals’ behav-
ior. This creates the ecological inference problem which posits that there are a number of 
different relationships at the individual level that could be causing the observation that I 
would find at the aggregate level and so it proves difficult to argue that the relationship I 
observe actually represents real changes in the observations and not some other extraneous 
variable. While I understand the implications of such a problem in my results, I hope that 
regardless, the relationship I find will help to push further research to be conducted that 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2010/iss1/10
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 109
address this limitation. 
Statistical Analysis 
Dependent Variable: Crime Rate as measured by the total number of individuals arrested 
from a particular country of origin for a particular year (2003-2007) divided by the total 
number of individuals in Catalonia from that specific country in that specific year. This will 
yield an arrest rate represented as a percentage of the population from that specific country 
of origin who within the past year was arrested for some crime. 
Independent Variables: Age and Gender Demographics and the Gross Domestic Product 
[GDP] were calculated for each immigrant population for their respective country of origin 
for each year between 2003 and 2007. 
The age and gender demographics for each immigrant population were calculated us-
ing data provided by Idescat. The GDP was calculated by the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF]. The IMF calculates the GDP using the current prices for each of the national cur-
rencies and then they convert them to U.S dollars with the unit of analysis being billions so 
that the rates are comparable.
Using SPSS software I performed a simple correlation, partial correlation and linear 
regression between the dependent variable of crime rate and the independent variables of 
age, gender and GDP demographics. 
Results
Using data provided by the Mosso d’ Esquadra and Idescat, I first calculated the crime 
rate for each immigrant group and that of native Spaniards. A higher crime rate was found 
for every immigrant population in Catalonia as compared to that of native Spaniards for 
each year examined (Figure 1) thus demonstrating that contrary to my original hypothesis 
there seems to be in fact a positive relationship between immigration and crime in the case 
examined. 
To examine the strength of the significance of the relationship between immigration 
and crime, using SPSS I performed a simple correlation between the independent variable 
of the country of origin for different immigrant populations (coded using dummy variables) 
and the dependent variable of crime rate measured as the percent of the population arrested 
for each of the years studied. 
A strong positive relationship was found to be statistically significant among immi-
grants originating from Bosnia and Herzegovina with p equally 0.000. A positive relation-
ship was found to be statistically significant among Georgian immigrants at the 0.01 signifi-
cance level and among Angolan immigrants at the 0.05 significance level. Among all other 
immigrant populations the relationship between crime rate and immigration was found to 
be statistically insignificant demonstrating that certain immigrant groups are more strongly 
correlated with higher crime rates than others (Table 1). 
I then performed a simple correlation using SPSS software between the independent 
variable of age and gender as measured by the percentage of men among the different age 
brackets and the dependent variable of crime rate (Table 2). A statistically significant positive 
relationship was found among men in the age brackets of 45 to 49 years and 50 to 54 years 
old at the 0.001 significance level. Among all other age groups the relationship was found 
to be statistically insignificant. 
Using the partial correlation test, I was then able to examine the relationship between 
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immigration and crime while controlling for the possible influence of age and gender de-
mographics and the Gross Domestic Product [GDP] of the different immigrant populations. 
A statistically significant positive relationship was still found among immigrants originating 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Angola at the 0.001 significance level and among Alge-
rian and Gambian immigrants at the 0.01 significance level. A statistically significant nega-
tive relationship was found among Polish immigrants at the 0.01 significance level (Table 3). 
This suggests that among immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Angola, Algeria and 
Gambia, age and gender demographic variables as well as the economic variable of GDP do 
not seem to explain their increased crime rates with respect to that of native Spaniards and 
other immigrant populations.  
Lastly using SPSS I performed a linear regression to further examine the significance 
of the relationship between crime and different countries of origins of immigrants with re-
spect to Spaniards and to account for the possible influence of the demographic variables. I 
regressed the dependent variable of the crime rate measured as percentage of the population 
arrested in a given year with 38 different immigrant-sending countries coded using dummy 
variables as well as their age, gender and GDP demographics for each of the years between 
2003-2007. This I hoped would allow me to evaluate the potential contribution of these 
demographics variables to the overrepresentation of immigrants in Catalonian crime rates.  
The linear regression model used proved to be statistically significant at the 0.001 sig-
nificance level, producing an F value of 13.895. The independent variables entered (country 
of origin, age, gender and GDP) into the linear regression also was found to account for 
86.3% of the variance in crime rate among different immigrant groups when compared to 
that of Spaniards (R² =0.863). When examining the influence of the country of origin in 
the relationship to crime, a statistically significant positive relationship was found among 
26 of the immigrant populations out of a total of 38 in comparison to Spaniards (Table 4). 
After controlling for the influence of disproportionate age, gender, GDP demographics 
among immigrant populations and for the differences in the years examined, I still found a 
significant relationship between different immigrant populations and their respective crime 
rates in Catalonia, Spain. 
Immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mali and Bangladesh had the highest in-
creased chance of being arrested, equal to approximately 22%, when compared to native 
Spaniards. The two immigrant groups with the lowest positive relationship with crime was 
found among immigrants from Portugal and Uruguay, who had an approximate 3% in-
creased chance of being arrested when compared to native Spaniards (Figure 2). 
 The previous percentages given all indicate the increased chances of immigrants from 
each country of origin of being arrested when compared to native Spaniards after the de-
mographic differences in age, gender and GDP were controlled for. These results indicate 
that my original hypothesis was incorrect. A significant positive relationship was still found 
among different immigrant populations even after I controlled for their differences in age, 
gender and GDP in comparison to that of native Spaniards. 
The only statistically significant negative relationship between crime and immigrants 
found was among immigrants from Great Britain [GB] at the 0.05 significance level. What 
this result suggests is that immigrants from GB when compared to Spaniards had a 5% de-
creased chance of being arrested. 
When examining the possible role of disproportionate age and gender demographics 
among immigrants, surprisingly a significant negative relationship was found among men 
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between the ages of 20 to 24 years old. A B value of -1.117 was found, indicating immigrant 
populations whose population is more heavily concentrated within this age demographic 
actually have an approximate 1% decrease in a chance of being arrested when compared 
to native Spaniards. Similarly, a significant negative relationship with respect to crime was 
found among immigrants’ populations with a higher concentration of its population falling 
between the ages of 35-39 equal to a 0.85% less likely chance of being arrested when com-
pared to Spaniards. Interestingly, the two age demographic brackets found to have a signifi-
cant positive relationship with crime was found among immigrant men between the ages of 
45-49 who had an approximately 1.5% increased chance of being arrested when compared 
to Spaniards and among immigrant men between 50-54 years old who had an approximate 
3% increased chance of being arrested when compared to Spaniards (Table 4).
To examine the possible influence of economic strain among different immigrant pop-
ulations and its possible implications in a relationship to crime, I controlled for the GDP of 
each country of origin. What I found is that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between a countries’ GDP and its respective immigrant population’s crime rate in Catalonia 
(Table 4). The results suggest that the economic situation of a country of origin has no affect 
on the propensity of the individuals in its immigrant population to commit crime. 
Conclusion and Limitations
Contrary to my original hypothesis, the results of this study have suggested that im-
migrant status is a significant factor in predicting criminal behavior among immigrant popu-
lations in Catalonia, Spain. In 26 of the 37 countries examined, a significant positive rela-
tionship was found among its immigrant populations and crime even after their age, gender 
and GDP demographics differences were controlled for. While significant differences were 
found between populations, those originating from Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and Asia had an increased chance of being arrested in comparison to Spaniards and other 
Western European immigrants. 
The study also suggests that the proportion of middle-aged men within an immigrant 
population is also a significant predictor of an increased crime rates among that immigrant 
population. Therefore the results found challenge the findings of previous scholars, such as 
Flowers (1989), which argue that the majority of crime is committed by younger males and 
that engagement in criminal behavior typically declines with age. 
Lastly this study challenges previous research, such as that conducted by Calavita 
(2005) and Stowell (2007), which argues that immigrants from poorer countries of origin 
are more likely to commit crime in the host country. No statistically significant relationship 
was found between a country’s GDP and the crime rate of its respective immigrant popula-
tion in Catalonia, Spain. 
While I had hoped that the results I found would be able to directly challenge the 
media’s portrayal of immigrant and restrictive government policies in Spain, the fact that I 
did find a relationship between immigration and crime does not confirm the legitmacy of 
such policies. Instead it demonstrates the need for further research into other variables that 
disproportionally affect immigrants such as unemployment, economic strain and quite pos-
sibly the role of the media and governmental policies in themselves that could be used to 
explain the relationship found. 
The results from this study have important limitations. The results cannot prove de-
finitively that immigrants are overwhelming more likely to be criminals; however what they 
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do suggest is that a relationship exists between immigrants and higher arrest rates. Whether 
this relationship can be explained by alternative variables such as police discrimination or 
harsh immigration laws is unknown but hopefully the questions that this study raises will 
encourage researchers to conduct further research into possibly why this relationship was 
found and its possible root causes. 
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Appendix A
Statistical Tests Results Tables
Table 1
Social Base of Country of Origin in Immigrant Crime Rate - 
Simple Correlation Analysis
Country of Origin Pearson Correlation
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.75***
Georgia 0.236**
Angola 0.185*
Source: Idescat (2003-2007); N= 178
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
Table 2
Social Bases of Age and Gender Demographics in Crime Rate - 
Simple Correlation Analysis
Percentage Men Pearson Correlation
0-14 years 0.083
15-19 years 0.075
20-24 years 0.081
25-29 years 0.085
30-34 years 0.008
35-39 years 0.023
40-44 years 0.14
45-49 years 0.308***
50-54 years 0.363***
55-59 years 0.018
60-64 years -.105
65+ years -.076
Source: Idescat (2003-2007); N = 178
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Table 3
Social Bases Country of origin in Immigrant Crime Rate, Controlling for Age, Gender and
GDP - Partial Correlation analysis
Country of Origin Correlation Coefficient
Bosnia and Herzegovina .712***
Poland -.216**
Angola 0.31***
Algeria .260**
Gambia -.243**
Source: Idescat (2003-2007); N = 159
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
Table 4
Social Bases of Immigrant Crime - Linear regression analysis
Variable: B SE
United States -11.856 10.806
Poland -1.320 1.65
Germany -.931 2.639
Great Britain -.5310* 2.365
Netherlands -.469 1.752
Italy 1.004 2.174
Ukraine 1.411 2.017
Belgium 2.009 1.97
France 2.066 1.9
Uruguay 3.157* 1.571
Portugal 3.219* 1.46
Argentina 3.247 1.691
Lebanon 3.373 2.039
Georgia 4.686** 1.775
Chile 5.197** 1.589
Russia 5.483* 2.645
Peru 5.699* 2.219
Venezuela 8.977** 2.563
Columbia 9.348*** 2.187
Rebecca Westbrook UC	San	Diego114
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China 9.422*** 2.607
Pakistan 9.661* 4.888
Gambia 10.053* 4.357
Brazil 10.350** 3.013
Senegal 11.176** 4.034
Ecuador 11.587*** 2.193
India 11.972** 4.034
Romania 12.012*** 1.94
Angola 12.275*** 3.267
Bolivia 12.364*** 2.773
Dominican Republic 12.368*** 2.921
Morocco 13.514*** 2.642
Nigeria 14.749*** 4.001
Algeria 15.170*** 4.19
Ghana 16.179* 6.173
Bosnia and Herzegovina 22.258*** 1.943
Mali 22.330*** 5.864
Bangladesh 22.551*** 5.244
% men 0-14 -.374 0.38
% men 15-19 -.656 0.342
% men 20-24 -1.117** 0.331
% men 25-29 0.126 0.233
% men 30-34 0.113 0.253
% men 35-39 -.850** 0.313
% men 40-44 0.012 0.275
% men 45-49 1.496** 0.516
% men 50-54 3.095*** 0.722
% men 55-59 1.04 0.964
% men 60-64 -.508 0.935
% men 65+ -.637 0.425
Gross Domestic Product .001 .001
F= 13.895***
R² = .863
Source: Idescat (2003-2007); N = 217
*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001
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Appendix B
Figures of Results
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